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INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS &RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS:
Implications and Pitfalls for Prosecutors and Defense Counsel in Complex
White-Collar Enforcement and Asset Forfeiture Actions
by Joseph Hernandez
IForfeiture laws have enormous implicai n Ifor small and medium sized corporaI i.-,3 w uwsed of criminal activity. For instance,
a white-collar money laundering or fraud enforcement action may be very broad due to the
interconnections between criminal activity and
financial transactions. Defendants often use
financial institutions and other property to facilitate their activities. In these cases, it is normal to include a criminal and/or civil forfeiture
count against property representing the proceeds or means that advanced the fraudulent
conduct. Those assets that are "Involved in" or
"facilitate" the fraudulent conduct are forfeitable' and may be seized in an ex parte hearing pending the outcome of a criminal or civil
enforcement action. Consequently, bank accounts, cars, planes, real property, among other
things, may be subject to forfeiture that assists
with developing, advancing, concealing, or otherwise enabling criminal activity.
Assume the following set of facts. A
medium-sized corporation (twenty to fifty employees) operates a business that generates several million dollars of revenue each year. For

all of the corporation's assets and the corporation is barely able to continue operating. Similarly, the individuals have had nearly all their
personal assets seized pending the outcome of
their prosecutions. It is the corporation's policy to indemnify its executives and employees
pursuant to state corporate law; however, the
corporation is unable to indemnify because the
underlying asset seizure prevents it.
Is a pretrial hearing available regarding
the seized corporate assets? What are the standards to securing the release of corporate assets? Who has standing to pursue that claim?
What occurs when both parties claim they need
those assets, which have been subject to an ex
parte seizure to secure defense counsel? These
are the challenges white-collar criminal practitioners must be prepared to manage when the
ocurrence of a corporate asset seizure affects
an indemnification agreement.
I. Forfeiture and Kaley v. United States
A. Civil and Criminal Forfeiture
The United States federal government

several years, though, a few executives and em- and most states have adopted broad civil and
ployees allegedly conducted criminal activity criminal forfeiture statutes. 2 These laws subthat benefitted the corporation and individu- ject all forms of property that either facilitate
als. Both are indicted with a criminal forfei2
This article will not provide an in-depth analysis and
ture count against the individuals, plus a paral- review of forfeiture. It will be limited to analyzing the general
lel civil forfeiture complaint is filed against the procedural and substantive issues that prosecutors and defense
corporation. The government has seized nearly counsel will likely confront when managing a complex whitecollar action involving the pretrial seizure of assets that are
1
18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006); see also 18
claimed to be necessary to pay for corporate and individual
U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006).
legal defense costs.
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or are the proceeds of criminal activity to for- ditionally, each statute permits "substitute asfeiture. Forfeiture is designed, inter alia, to sets" to be used in the event the assets subject
deter criminal activity by serving as a form of to forfeiture are not located or available.10
punishment and to combat the incentives that
The structure of both civil and criminal
may make criminal activity valuable by disgorgforfeiture permits the government to pursue
ing illicit gains.4
parallel enforcement actions. Under 28 U.S.C.
Civil forfeiture is an in rem action against § 2461(c), when a civil forfeiture action is auproperty used to facilitate or represent the pro- thorized, a successful criminal conviction can
ceeds of criminal activity.' There are several serve as the predicate for action on the civil
federal civil forfeiture laws; however, two com- forfeiture if no specific statutory provision is
monly used statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 981 (fi- available for criminal forfeiture. This enables
nancial crimes) and 21 U.S.C. § 881 (narcotics). the government to combine a criminal convicFor purposes of white-collar crime, 18 U.S.C. tion and civil forfeiture in a consolidated pro§ 981(a)(1)(A) renders forfeitable all real and ceeding." Additionally, the government may
personal property relating to money launder- stay a civil forfeiture proceeding pending the
ing, currency transaction reporting crimes, fi- outcome of the criminal case. 12
nancial transaction crimes, or fraud against the
To assure assets are not used, concealed,
United States. These statutes provide that the
government may, in certain circumstances, seize lost, or destroyed prior to the completion of a
and take control of property prior to securing civil or criminal action, the government seizes
forfeiture upon the demonstration of probable the property. Typically, this is achieved through
cause.' Pursuant to the Relation Back Doc- an exparte proceeding via a grand jury indicttrine, the government is vested with title to the ment in the case of a criminal forfeiture or a
warrant based on probable cause in the context
property upon the commission of the act giving
rise to forfeiture.' The government's burden to of a civil forfeiture."
secure forfeiture is by a preponderance of the 10
18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(p)
(1)-(2) (2006).
evidence.'
11

Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand,
is an in personam proceeding designed to serve
as a form of punishment in the penalty phase.9
Typically, it is attached to an indictment as a
separate count. There are a range of statutes
that involve criminal forfeiture but three prevalent statutes are: 18 U.S.C. § 982 (money laundering and financial crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(RICO); and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (narcotics). Ad3
See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (mandating that a person
convicted of certain offenses be ordered to forfeit property
involved in the offense).
4
S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 84 (1984), reprintedin 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3267.
5
See, e.g., United States v. One 1998 Tractor, 288 F.
Supp. 2d 710 (W.D. Va. 2003).
6
18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(1)-(4) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)
(2006).
7
18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (2006).
8
18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2006).
9
United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1082 (3d Cir.
1996).
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See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 619 F.3d 713, 720 (7th

Cir. 2010) (asserting that criminal forfeiture is available for
convictions of mail and wire fraud, not just circumstances af-

fecting financial institutions); United States v. Schlesinger, 514
F.3d 277, 277-78 (2d Cir. 2008);
12
18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1) (2006).

13
Under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
(CAFRA), the government must show a "substantial connection" between the assets and criminal activity. See Pub.
L. No. 106-185 (2000) codified as 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)
(2006). Previously, courts had applied two general approaches
in assessing probable cause: "substantial connection" and
"facilitation." Under the "substantial connection" standard
the government must show that that the property was actively involved in perpetuating criminal activity. See United
States v. $252,000 U.S. Currency, 484 F.3d 1271, 1274-75
(10th Cir. 2007) (affirming that in a civil forfeiture action the
government demonstrated probable cause that currency was
"substantially connected" to illegal drug trafficking when it
was lawfully discovered in a box and briefcase, bundled in
stacks and wrapped in cellophane smelling of marijuana, and
the driver initially denied knowledge and then later claimed it
was for a business venture). ContraUnited States v. One 1989
Jaguar XJ6, No. 92 C 1491,WL 157630 (N.D. Ill. May 13,

1993), at *2-3 (holding that a "substantial connection" was not
2
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B. Constitutional Implications
The seizure of property implicates the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of individuals and corporations." When a defendant
claims he or she needs those assets to secure
counsel of choice, courts have recognized that
individuals have an opportunity to a post-mdictment hearing.15 However, the scope of that
hearing has led to a split across the federal circuits. On October 16, 2013, the United States.
Supreme Court heard arguments in Kaley .
United States." The question presented was
whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a defendant have the opportunity
to challenge the underlying charges of an indictment or merely the traceability of assets to
criminal activity. The majority view, colloquially known as a Jones-Farmerhearing, provides a
defendant who has been indicted with a pretrial hearing to demonstrate that property is not

traceable to criminal activity." The minority
view holds that the due process issues implicated require a more comprehensive hearing
that permits a defendant to present evidence
attacking the basis for the underlying criminal
indictment."
In Kaley, the facts involve a white-collar enforcement action where personal assets have
been subject to pretrial seizure. The alleged
facts, highly summarized, are that Kerri and
Brian Kaley were involved in a scheme stealing and reselling medical devices. 9 A criminal
forfeiture count led to the seizure of property
that a grand jury determined was the proceeds
of criminal activity. The Kaleys claimed they
needed those assets to retain their defense
counsel. 20 At the Jones-Farmerhearing, the trial
court limited the scope of review to traceability
without permitting inquiries into the review of
the grand jury's indictment. When the Kaleys
failed to present evidence and requested an opportunity to challenge the basis for the indictment, the district court affirmed its protective
order to seized assets.2 1

shown when a vehicle that provided transportation between
the locations where alleged fraudulent transactions occurred to
sustain a seizure of the vehicle). Alternatively, if the statutory language includes the language "to facilitate," it grants a
more permissive degree of forfeiture to forfeit legitimate funds
or property that have been commingled with illicit funds or
Based on questioning at the Supreme
property. See U.S. v. Coffman, 859 F.Supp.2d 871, 875-76
Court, the Justices appeared flummoxed as
(E.D. Ky. 2012) (holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 982 "clean"
how
to resolve the due process and Fifth and
funds commingled with tainted funds are forfeitable because
the commingling enables and disguises money laundering).
Sixth Amendment issues presented.2 2 While
Contra United States v. $448,342.85 U.S. Currency, 969 F.2d
474, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that pooling tainted funds 17
United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 646-47 (10th
with legitimate funds was not sufficient to forfeit property).
Cir. 1998) (holding that a proper balance of private and
14
See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S.
government interests requires a post-restraint, pre-trial hear617, 624-27 (1989) (holding that a defendant does not have a
ing only upon defendant's motion); United States v. Fanner,
Sixth Amendment right to use assets subject to a pretrial re274 F.3d 800, 805 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that due process
straining order to retain counsel of choice); see also Mathews
requires a hearing to challenge probable cause on the limited
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (holding that in
grounds of traceability).
weighing due process considerations a court should assess
18
See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1195,
three factors: one, the private interest that will be affected;
1197 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that additional safeguards are
two, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
necessary to protect a defendant's due process rights); United
States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holdthe procedures used and value represented by additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and three, the government's
ing that pre-deprivation hearings are required unless there are
interest at stake, including the burdens of additional or substiextraordinary circumstances).
19
United States v. Kaley, 79 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir.
tute procedures).
15
United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 645-49 (10th
2009).
Cir.1998); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1191-94
20
Id. at 1250-51.
(2d Cir.1991); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d
21
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th
Cir.1981); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25
Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013).
(8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706,
22
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kaley v.
724-26 (7th Cir. 1988).
United States (2013) (No. 12-464), availableat
16
Kaley v. United States, Docket No. 12-464 (U.S. Oct http://www.supremecourt.gov/oml arguments/argument tran16, 2013).
scripts/12-464j 3ko.pdf [hereinafter Kaley Oral Argument].
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the Justices seemed to agree that a defendant
has a right to be heard in a meaningful manner
at an appropriate time, the extent of that opportunity to be heard was largely unclear from
the dialogue at oral arguments.2 3
The longstanding tradition and constitutional mandate is that a grand jury's determination is presumptively valid for a criminal indictment. 24 To this issue, Justice Alito expressed
concern that a pretrial hearing could aggravate
the government's case by requiring the revelation of sensitive information and witness identification. 25 This was a key point emphasized

in the government's petition for certiorari and
brief 26 Justice Ginsburg similarly expressed
reservation as to whether a judge could preside
over a case when a judge determines probable
cause does not exist.27 Alternatively, Justices
Roberts and Scalia seemed skeptical of the
government's position, with Justice Scalia asking whether courts should demand more than
probable cause when seized assets are necessary for securing counsel of choice.2 8 Justice
Breyer seemed to present a possible compromise between the positions when he suggested
that defendants could have greater opportunities to explore the nexus between assets and
an indictment subject to greater control by the
judge.2 9 With such control, the judge can impose restriction that avoids a "mini-trial" that
the federal government argued would arise.

strate he has standing to challenge the seizure.
Second, he must allege and then show he has
no other assets available to pay for his criminal defense.32 Any valuable property that a defendant owns must be expensed or committed
towards legal defense fees. An exception may
be available upon a showing that procedural
due process rights are at stake," or evidence
that seized property is owned by a third-party.34 Third, the defendant bears the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the underlying property did not facilitate
or is not the proceeds of criminal activity.35

It. Indemnification Agreements:
Implications for the Seizure of Corporate
Assets
A question implicated, but not specifically addressed by Kaley, is the impact asset
seizure may have on the ability to honor an in-

demnification agreement when both corporate
and individual asset seizures disable securing
counsel of choice. An indemnification agreement is provided pursuant to state corporation
law by protecting corporate agents

execu-

tives, officers, and employees from liability
associated with decisions committed within
the scope of their employment." The limitation on these agreements is that an agent must
act in "good faith" and not be convicted of a
criminal violation.3 7

F.3d at 803-04; Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1195-96 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id.
31
32
Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 647-68 (10th Cir.); Farmer,274
The law currently requires a defendant F.3d at 803-04; Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1195-96 (2d Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real
show three factors to succeed in a Jones-Farmer 33
hearing.30 First, the defendant must demon- Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52-53 (1993) (holding that government
violated procedural due process rights by seizing real property
23
See generally id.
exparte without notice or hearing for the owner, reasoning
24
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)
that property cannot be moved or hidden, thus concerns about
(stating "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and
defendant moving, losing, or hiding property are not present);
unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prossee also 18 U.S.C. § 985 (codifying the position articulated in
ecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the
JamesDaniel GoodReal Prop).
charge on the merits").
34
18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (innocent-owner defense); 18
25
Kaley Oral Argument at 12-13, 46-47.
U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A)(i) (bona-fide purchaser for value).
26
Brief for the United States at 11, Kaley v. United
35
18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(B)(iii).
States, 677 F.3d 1316 (2013) (No. 12-464).
36
See generally MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156D, §
27
Kaley Oral Argument at 9-10.
8.51 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (West); N.Y Bus.
28
See id. at 30-32
CORP. LAW § 725 (McKinney).
29
See id. at 32-34, 48-49.
37
See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Sers., Inc., 88
30
Jones, 160 F.3d at 647-68 (10th Cir.); Farmer,274
F.3d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying indemnification to a

C. Jones-FarmerHearingRequirements
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Criminal or civil forfeiture action represents
a threat to the ability of a corporation to uphold an indemnification agreement. A seizure
of nearly all of a corporation's assets raises the
question of whether a corporation could make
a claim to assets on behalf of itself and an individual claiming indemnification; or whether
a corporation may only assert a claim for itself.
Unique risks are presented that prosecutors
and defense counsel will likely need to consider when an individual claims that a corporation
owes them a duty to indemnify but is denied
indemnification because of the seizure of corporate assets. Depending upon the extent of
the government's pretrial seizure, the cooperation of the individual defendant and corporation, and the complexity of a given case, strategic decisions made by defense counsel and
prosecutors must weigh a range of potential
factors.
The standards for a Jones-Farmerhearing would apply to a corporation asserting a
claim to seized corporate assets: standing, no
other available assets, and preponderance of
the evidence that assets are not traceable to
criminal activity. With respect to standing, the
operative question is, "to whom are corporate
assets vested?" This is almost always the corporation itself, which means only the corporation
has standing to challenge the seizure of corporate assets and not the individual defendants
or shareholders." Thus, the question becomes
what additional recourse an individual may
have to secure the release of assets pursuant to
an indemnification agreement.
vice-president for failure to demonstrate "good faith" under
Delaware corporate law).
38
See, e.g., United States v. Wyly, 193 F.3d 289, 304
(5th Cir. 1999) (denying standing to shareholders who challenged seizure of corporate assets because under Louisiana
law shareholder's interest is in stock issued and not corporate
assets); United States v. $20,193.39 U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d
344, 346 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that unsecured creditors,

unlike secured creditors, lacked standing to challenge civil
forfeiture of property seized from businesses, even when all
assets were seized); United States v. New Silver Palace Rest.,
810 F.Supp. 440, 442 (E.D.N.Y 1992) (holding shareholders
of restaurant used to facilitate drug transactions did not have
standing, since shareholders were not owners or lienholders
with respect to corporate assets).

A. Defense Counsel: Strategy and
Considerations
When the interests of the individual
and corporation align, the optimal strategy for
defense counsel and the corporation is coop-

eration. The individual wants to avoid being
convicted of the underlying crime; similarly,
the corporation does not want to be liable under respondeatsuperior. The corporation could
assert a Jones-Farmerclaim for itself and the
defendant by claiming the government seizure
of corporate assets causes a breach of contract.
Because the corporation is the party in breach
in this instance, it could attach as part of a
Jones-Farmermotion, an invoice detailing what
is necessary to pay the legal fees of both parties.
This enables the individual defendant to avoid
being subject to a Jones-Farmerhearing and the
concomitant requirement that he have no personal assets available to pay legal defense fees. 9

On the contrary, when the interests of
the individual and corporation diverge, the
corporation may assert that the individual defendant has failed to uphold his duty of "good

faith" and will only pursue a Jones-Farmermotion to advance the interest of the corporation.
The corporation is asserting as an affirmative
defense that public policy permits it to deny indemnification. This claim would raise contract
and corporate law disputes that could involve
complex statutory and legal questions regarding the terms of the agreement. The individual

defendant's recourse in this situation is likely
twofold: one, sue for enforcement of the indemnification agreement, or two, move for a
Jones-Farmerhearing releasing personal assets
that have been seized and then seek indemnification in the event of success on the merits. 40
Clearly, the best strategy in this situation de39
To the author's knowledge, there has been no case
where this has occurred in the context of a Jones-Farmer
forfeiture proceeding.
40
Delaware law provides that when an agent has been
"successful" on the merits, that person shall be indemnified
for expenses including attorneys' fees. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(c); see also MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.52
(mandating indemnification when a defendant is "[w]holly
successful, on the merits or otherwise").
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pends upon individual circumstances.
B. Prosecution: Strategy and Considerations

fees. 4 At this time, the court granted the government's motion, reasoning the evidence presented at trial supported this argument.46 Thus,
an indemnification agreement can be subject
to pretrial seizure when the right facts present
themselves. As demonstrated by Wittig, a prosecutor has to calculate the risks of exposing information relating to his case-in-chief, a point
emphasized during oral arguments in Kaley.

The prosecutor's goal is to assure that
forfeitable assets are maintained pending the
outcome of a criminal prosecution or civil action. While needing to be mindful of their actions on interfering with a defendant's access
to counsel, a prosecutor could argue that an
indemnification agreement is itself forfeitable.
A prosecutor should also be cautious
A prosecutor could reasonably argue that an when seeking to block advancement of legal
indemnification agreement represents a means fees. There is a fine line between an argument
to facilitate criminal activity. In a sophisti- that indemnification is forfeitable and intercated corporate fraud scheme, the individuals ference with a defendant's Sixth Amendment
involved may consider the legal risks of their right to counsel. Specifically, a prosecutor
actions and be prepared for the possibility of should limit his arguments to those subjects
subsequent liability. Thus, indemnification is relating to the enforcement of forfeiture laws
not available but instead should be considered, in a specific case rather than advancing other
along with other means that facilitate criminal policy or legal goals. For instance, in United
activity, to be forfeitable.
States (. Stein,4 the U.S. Department of Justice
For instance, in UnitedStates 9. Wittig, the adopted a policy that an employer's payment of
prosecution brought a forty count indictment an employee's attorney fees would count as a
with a forfeiture count for numerous pieces of lack of cooperation. The government's policy,
property, including the right to advanced pay- and statements to the company during litigament of legal fees, as mandated in the compa- tion, led the corporation to cease paying legal
ny's Articles of Incorporation.4 1 The prosecu- fees. The court dismissed the case citing violation claimed that Wittig and a co-conspirator tions of the employees' due process rights.
joined the company, Westar Energy, with the
III. Conclusion
intent to defraud the company of millions of
dollars.4 2 Prior to trial, the government argued
The decision in Kaley will help resolve
that the right to advancement was only avail- the procedural parameters that a criminal deable if the defendant "came on board with the fendant has in seeking to unfreeze assets subproper intent," but they failed to present ex- ject to a pretrial seizure order to pay for legal
trinsic evidence, relying only on argument at defense costs. It is inevitable that there will be
a Jones-Farmerhearing.43 The court denied the unanswered questions regarding issues of inmotion, ruling argument alone was insufficient demnification rights when a corporation and
to support a probable cause determination that individual defendant argue they need corpothe indemnification agreement was connected rate assets to secure defense counsel pursuant
to the alleged criminal activity.44 Following a to an indemnification agreement. However, it
mistrial and the full presentation of the gov- is not unreasonable to foresee such a case givernment's case-in-chief, the prosecution moved en the sweeping nature of forfeiture statutes.
again to restrain the advancement of legal
41
See United States v. Wittig, 333 F.Supp.2d 1048,
1053-54 (D. Kan. 2004).
42
See id. at 1051-52.
43
Id. at 1052.
Id.
44
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/7
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45
See United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142JAR, 2005
WL 1227914, at *1 (D. Kan. May 23, 2005).
46
Id. at *4.
47
435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd 541 F.3d
130 (2d Cir. 2008).
6
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